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ARGUMENT
I.

THERE EXIST SIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT WHICH REQUIRE A HEARING ON THE MERITS.

The plaintiff contends that summary judgment was justified
since the defendant offered no evidence contradicting the terms of
the stipulation, or clarifying the decedent's intent in relation to
the contract; however, plaintiff failed to provide the court with
any

legally

sufficient

evidence

or

affidavits

to

justify

her

motion.
The decree of divorce did not refer to the life insurance
since the suspect provision contained in the stipulation was left
out of the decree.
vague

and

Furthermore, the language in the stipulation is

clearly

subject

to

interpretation.

The

provision

required each party to "continue in force and effect any life
insurance policies that each party currently has for the benefit of
the minor child of the parties." Nowhere in the stipulation or the
decree is the term "beneficiary" used.

There exists a factual

basis to conclude that the decedent understood and intended the
provision to require an assurance that the child would receive
child support in case of his death.
assume,

that

in

light

of

Further, it is reasonable to

that

understanding,

an

actual

"beneficiary" status would be unnecessary.
The trial court erred in granting the motion for summary
judgment in light of the ambiguities.

Utah follows the general

rule

are

that

"only

when

contract

terms

complete,

clear

and

unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a motion for
summary judgment."

Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d, 488 (1983).

1

A

contract is ambiguous "if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, missing
terms or other facial deficiencies."

Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813

P.2d 104, 108 (1991) (quoting from Faulkner v. Farnsworth 665 P.2d
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983) .
Furthermore, and contrary to the reasoning of the plaintiff,
the moving party has the burden to prove that there exists no issue
as to any material fact.

In the case of Fox v. Allstate Insurance

Company 453 P.2d 701 (Utah 1969), plaintiff brought suit seeking
reimbursement from his insurance company for the loss of his boat,
which he alleged struck a submerged item in Utah Lake and sunk.
Plaintiff

brought

affidavit

which

a motion
in

essence

for summary
reiterated

judgment
his

and

filed

complaint.

an
The

defendant's insurance company relied on circumstantial evidence and
could

not

allegations.

produce

direct

evidence

The motion was granted.

contrary

to

plaintiff's

On appeal, the Supreme Court

reversed the lower court and remanded for a trial on the merits.
The court, in supporting its reasoning provided the following
analogy:
. . . anyone could allege that he ate a mouse which was
in a can of pork and beans, and while he might or might
not be able to recover on the trial of the action against
the canner and distributor of the food, he could win on
a motion for summary judgment simply because there could
not be a counter affidavit filed saying that there was no
mouse in the can. All that a defendant could do in a
situation such as is supposed above or in this case would
be to rely on circumstantial evidence and the wisdom and
honesty and good judgment of the jury to arrive at a
correct verdict. Id. at 705-706 (emphasis added)
In

the

case

at

hand,

the

defendant

cannot

produce

testimony or affidavit of the deceased, Marlon Cutler.

2

the

However,

defendant can produce significant evidence as to the ambiguities of
the

contract,

Mr.

Cutler's

understanding

and

intent

relating

thereto, and evidence concerning the equities of a division of the
insurance proceeds.
Even more compelling is the fact that the affidavits upon
which plaintiff relied are legally insufficient, rely on hearsay
and fail to address the decedent's intent and understanding as to
paragraph

3(c)

of

the

stipulation

paragraph from the decree of divorce.

and

the

omission

of

that

Clearly defendant should be

afforded the opportunity to present evidence at a trial on the
merits.
II.

EXPLICIT LANGUAGE MUST EXIST IN THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE IN ORDER TO DIVEST THE EXPECTANCY
INTEREST OF THE NAMED BENEFICIARY.

Plaintiff contends that Culbertson v. Continental Assurance
Co. ,

631

P. 2d

906

(Utah,

1981)

is

inapplicable

because

in

Culbertson the ex-wife was the named beneficiary and the widow
brought the action in equity to have the proceeds given to her.
Contrary to plaintiff's reading of Culbertson, the case stands for
the

proposition

that

a

court

must

find

specific

enforceable

language in the decree of divorce in order to divest the named
beneficiary's expectancy

interest in the life insurance proceeds.

The case specifically deals with whether a named beneficiary may
retain the life insurance proceeds due to a lack of clarity or
specificity

in

the

decree

of

divorce.

Under

the

Culbertson

analysis, there must be a finding as to whether there exists an
expectancy interest in both the plaintiff and the defendant.

The

trial court never did address these factual issues in the present
case.
3

Plaintiff also attempts to rely on Travelers Insurance Company
v. Lewis 531 P. 2d 484 (Utah 1975) .

The factual circumstance in

that case was similar to the case at hand; however the language
which addressed the life insurance policy in the decree of divorce
was very specific and unambiguous.

The provision designated the

policy

defined

amounts,

and

specifically

who

would

be

the

beneficiary and stated that the minor children would be named
contingent

beneficiaries.

Travelers

falls directly under

the

Culbertson analysis. Culbertson requires a court to define whether
any of the parties have expectancy interests, and if so to divest
that interest if the language in the decree is clear and not open
to interpretation.

However, like the case at hand, if the language

is unclear and ambiguities exist, a court should not divest the
named beneficiary's expectancy interest without a trial on the
merits.

See Culbertson, 631 P.2d at 912.

III. MANIFEST INJUSTICE EXISTS WHEN A RULING FAILS
TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EQUITABLE FACTS WHICH
VALIDATE THE APPELLANT'S EXPECTANCY INTEREST.
The trial court failed to address the competing equities in
the case and refused to allow the defendant the opportunity to
present such evidence.

In so doing, the court relied on legally

insufficient affidavits which did not sufficiently prove that no
material issue of fact existed as to the understanding and intent
of the parties in relation to the language in the stipulation and
the lack of language in the decree.

Furthermore, the trial court

failed to allow the defendant to present evidence at a trial on the
merits of competing equities which support at a minimum a division
of the policy proceeds between the parties.

4

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests that the judgment be reversed
and the proceeds of the life insurance policies be awarded to the
defendant,

or

alternatively,

that

the

case

be

remanded

with

instructions to divide the proceeds equitably.
DATED this

^

day of December, 1993

QHRISTOPJffiR L. SHAW
t t o r n e y for Appellant/Defendant
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6
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DETERMINATIVE RULE
DFC 1 0 7993

COURT OF APPEALS
Rule 56- Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant, A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) F o r m of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of Iris pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application fot* judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits m a d e in b a d faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused

